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Municipal Law. Maynard v. Beck, 741 A.2d 866 (R.I. 1999).
Where municipal officials are engaged in actions that are legisla-
tive in character, the doctrine of legislative immunity bars a law-
suit against the officials, regardless of the actual motives of the
officials.
In Maynard v. Beck,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the doctrine of legislative immunity barred a lawsuit against
municipal officials based on their attempts to draft, revise and pass
a zoning ordinance.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1991, the General Assembly passed the Rhode Island Zon-
ing Enabling Act (the Act).2 The Act mandated that zoning laws be
drafted in conformity with a comprehensive plan prepared in ac-
cordance with the Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and
Land Use Regulation Act.3 In 1992, the city of Charlestown estab-
lished a Comprehensive Plan as required by the Act.4 Charles-
town's plan established objectives and criteria for implementing
new zoning laws.5 A committee, known as the Zoning Ordinance
Coordinating Committee, was then appointed by the town council
to create a proposed zoning law.6 Once the proposed law was
drafted, the planning commission reviewed it. 7 In October of 1995,
the proposed zoning law was certified by the planning commission
as being in conformity with Charlestown's Comprehensive Plan.,
1. 741 A.2d 866 (R.I. 1999).
2. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 45-24-27 to 45-24-72 (1956) (1999 Reenactment)
3. R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-30 (1956) (1999 Reenactment); see also R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 45-22.2-1 to 45-22.2-14 (1956) (1999 Reenactment) (comprising the Rhode
Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act.).
4. See Maynard, 741 A.2d at 868.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-52 (1956) (1999 Reenactment).
The statute reads, in pertinent part:
Among its findings and recommendations to the city or town council
with respect to a proposal for adoption, amendment, or repeal of a zoning
ordinance or zoning map, the planning board or commission shall:
(1) Include a statement on the general consistency of the proposal with
the comprehensive plan of the city or town, including the goals and poli-
cies statement, the implementation program, and all other applicable ele-
ments of the comprehensive plan; and
SURVEY SECTION
The proposed zoning law was then sent to the town council for its
consideration. 9 The town council found that the proposed zoning
law violated the Comprehensive Plan and, thus, refused to approve
it.10
Plaintiffs, property owners and former local public officials in
Charlestown, sued defendants, municipal planning and other town
officials. 1 Plaintiffs asserted that defendants' attempts to create a
proposed new zoning law were unlawful. 12 They alleged that de-
fendants changed certain parts of the proposed zoning law for their
own benefit, thereby causing it to violate the town's Comprehen-
sive Plan.' 3 Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.' 4
The motion justice treated defendants' dismissal motion "as a mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted."' 5 He concluded that the town council rejected the issues
raised by the plaintiffs in their complaint and, hence, the issues
were not appropriate for review.' 6 Furthermore, the town council
never enacted the zoning ordinance law drafted by the commission;
thus, the "plaintiffs were not aggrieved parties."' 7 Moreover, the
motion justice concluded that the defendants should be allowed to
accomplish their discretionary duties without judicial interfer-
ence.18 Finally, he dismissed plaintiffs' claim for legal damages be-
cause he found that the defendants' actions were entitled to
absolute legislative immunity,19 pursuant to the recent United
States Supreme Court holding in Bogan v. Scott-Harris.20
Plaintiffs then initiated a second lawsuit in superior court.21
They argued that the trial justice's determination that the defend-
(2) Include a demonstration of recognition and consideration of each of
the applicable purposes of zoning ....
Id.
9. See Maynard, 741 A.2d at 868.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 869.
15. Id.; R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
16. See Maynard, 741 A.2d at 869.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) (holding that "local legislators are absolutely im-
mune from suit for their legislative activities").
21. See Maynard, 741 A.2d at 869.
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ants were entitled to legislative immunity was in error.22 Thus,
their legal damages action against defendants should not have
been dismissed.23
BACKGROUND
In Bogan v. Scott-Harris, Janet Scott-Harris worked for the
Department of Health and Human Services for the city of Fall
River, Massachusetts. 24 In the course of her employment, Scott-
Harris prepared to fire a temporary employee who had supposedly
made prejudiced statements against other city employees. 25 Using
political channels, the employee avoided being fired and even man-
aged to have her punishment reduced. 26 As the charges against
the employee were pending, the mayor submitted to the city coun-
cil a budget proposal that would require elimination of 135 city po-
sitions.27 Scott-Harris' position was among those included in the
budget proposal for elimination. 28 The city council approved the
mayor's proposal and the mayor signed the budget into law,
thereby eliminating Scott-Harris' position.29 Scott-Harris sued the
city and numerous city officials, including the mayor and the chair-
man of the city council ordinance committee. 30
The United States Supreme Court held that absolute legisla-
tive immunity protected the defendants' actions.31 In making a de-
termination as to whether their conduct was legislative, the Court
was required to look at the conduct itself, instead of what was mo-
tivating the individuals engaging in the conduct. 32 The Court de-
termined that defendants' acts were legislative in both form and
substance and, thus, legislative immunity applied because "[tihe
ordinance reflected a discretionary, policy-making decision impli-
cating the budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city
provides to its constituents."33
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 46.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 46-47.
27. See id. at 47.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 49.
32. See id. at 54.
33. Id. at 55-56.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court had to determine whether
legislative immunity applied to the actions of the municipal offi-
cials in Charlestown.3 4 If, after removing all considerations of pur-
pose and motivation, defendants' actions were "legislative in
character," the doctrine of legislative immunity applied and pro-
tected them from lawsuits.35 Thus, even if defendants had been
motivated by their own personal and political gain to pursue the
chosen course of conduct, their "acts were [nonetheless] committed
in the course of performing their discretionary functions or duties
as government officials in crafting and then presenting proposed
municipal legislation for its potential adoption by the town coun-
cil."36 The supreme court found that legislative immunity pro-
tected such actions.37
Furthermore, the court noted that the doctrine of legislative
immunity did not apply solely to legislators.38 All officials warrant
legislative immunity when they are engaged in legislative busi-
ness.39 Courts should use "a 'functional approach to immunity
questions' . . . so that even when a judicial body enacts rules 'of
general application,' such an action can be considered legislative in
nature and entitled to absolute immunity."40
The supreme court also considered plaintiffs' argument that
"the challenged actions of the planning commission and the town
planner [did] not rise to the level of legislative policy-making;
therefore . . . the actions of those defendants [should have been]
considered administrative, not legislative."41 Plaintiffs argued
that some courts had set up a two-part test to ascertain whether
conduct was legislative, rather than merely administrative or exec-
utive.42 In Carver v. Foerster,43 the Third Circuit established such
34. See Maynard, 741 A.2d at 868.
35. Id. at 870 (citing Bogan, 523 U.S. at 44).
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. (citing Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 871 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); Supreme
Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980)
(respectively)).
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. 102 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1996).
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a test, setting forth criteria to determine whether actions were leg-
islative or administrative: "[tlo be legislative, the act must be (1)
substantively legislative, such as 'policy-making of a general pur-
pose' or 'line-drawing;' and (2) procedurally legislative, such that it
is 'passed by means of established legislative procedures. ' "44 In
Carver, the individual defendants, prior to and independent of
their statutory roles, had fired several employees for their own per-
sonal gain. 45 As a result, their actions were found to be outside the
scope of legislative immunity.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that Maynard was
distinguishable from Carver because the defendants' duties in
Maynard were undertaken as an advisory arm of a legislative
body, i.e., the town council. 46 The town council made the ultimate
decision of whether or not to adopt a proposed law.4 7 The planning
officials had no actual power to adopt a proposed law themselves.48
Instead, "they were required by law to assist and advise a munici-
pal legislative body in their decision-making process by presenting
a draft ordinance for its consideration."49
The court found that the defendants' actions were an essential
part of the legislative process whereby their municipality enacted
appropriate zoning laws, stating that "the defendants' actions
play[ed] a key role in the eventual enactment or rejection of this
municipality's proposed zoning legislation."50 Thus, defendant
planning officials were protected by legislative immunity "for their
legislative-assistance activities," while defendant town councilors
were protected by legislative immunity "for their discretionary and
policy-making decisions."51 It was wholly irrelevant "[tihat the
planning commission's activities [were] not the final step in the or-
dinance-adoption process ... as long as its members [were] per-
forming legislative functions." 52
44. Id. at 100 (quoting Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (3d
Cir. 1989)).
45. See id.
46. See Maynard, 741 A.2d at 871.
47. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-53(a) (1956) (1999 Reenactment)
("No zoning ordinance shall be adopted, repealed, or amended until after a public
hearing has been held upon the question before the city or town council.")).
48. See id.
49. Id. at 871-72.
50. Id. at 872.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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CONCLUSION
When municipal officials act in a legislative capacity, such as
when they attempt to draft, revise and pass a zoning ordinance,
the doctrine of legislative immunity bars actions for legal damages
against the officials. It is of no consequence that the officials may
have been motivated by purely selfish reasons, such as personal or
political gain, or that their actions were only one part of a larger
process.
Helena R. Pacheco
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Municipal Law. Munroe v. Town of East Greenwich, 733 A.2d
703 (R.I. 1999). The Development and Subdivision Review En-
abling Act (the Development Review Act) supersedes inconsistent
town ordinances adopted pursuant to the home rule charter provi-
sion. In addition, land development and zoning statutes supersede
local regulations, and procedural requirements for implementation
of the Development Review Act do not infringe on town form of
government.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Respondents David and Donna Munroe (the Munroes) are
abutting owners to a 35.5 acre parcel of vacant land owned by
Philip Ryan Homes, Ltd. (Ryan).' Ryan sought to subdivide the
property into ten house lots.2 Acting in accordance with proce-
dural requirements, Ryan submitted his plans to the East Green-
wich town council, which was acting as the Platting and
Subdivision Board.3 After the town council conditionally approved
Ryan's final plans, the Munroes appealed the town council's deci-
sion to the town's zoning board of review, which was acting as a
board of appeal.4 By unanimous vote, the Munroes' appeal was
denied.5
Thereafter, the Munroes filed a complaint in the Kent County
Superior Court, contending that the board's decision was made "in
violation of constitutional, statutory, ordinance or planning board
regulation provisions, in excess of the authority granted to the
planning board by statute and ordinance, and was made upon un-
lawful procedures."6 The trial court agreed with the Munroes, and
held that the board of appeal's decision upholding the town coun-
cil's approval violated the procedural requirements of the Develop-
ment Review Act.7 The town and town council then filed a petition
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court to review this judgment.8
1. See Munroe v. Town of East Greenwich, 733 A.2d 703, 704 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 704-05.
4. See id. at 705.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
At trial, the superior court relied in part upon the Rhode Is-
land Zoning Enabling Act of 1991, which states that zoning dis-
tricts "shall require that any land development project be referred
to the city or town planning board or commission for approval."9
East Greenwich's town charter provides that the town council shall
act as the Platting and Subdivision Board.' 0 The superior court
concluded that the town usurped the decision-making authority
provided by the Development Review Act, which vests that author-
ity "upon [a town's] planning board in favor of a town council act-
ing as a platting board.""
In its appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the town ar-
gued that the trial court misapplied the law of statutory construc-
tion in relying on the Development Review Act, misapplied the law
and improperly attacked the validity of the town council's author-
ity as established by charter, and violated the Home Rule Charter
Amendment of the Rhode Island Constitution. 12
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its analysis by noting
that the town may permit the town council to exercise power over
land development. 13 However, the legislature may require a plan-
ning board to perform duties as assigned by any act of the General
Assembly.' 4 The court then stated that "[tihe Development Re-
view Act is such an act and supersedes inconsistent ordinances
adopted pursuant to the charter."' 5
The Development Review Act is an act of general application
that would supersede an inconsistent home rule charter provision
directing a town council to act as a planning board.' 6 This follows
the general rule that state laws of statewide application pre-empt
municipal ordinances if the legislature intended for the state laws
to occupy the field. 17
9. Id. at 706 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-47(B) (1956) (1999
Reenactment)).
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 703; R.I. Const. art. XIII.
13. See Munroe, 733 A.2d at 707.
14. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-22-7(d) (1956) (1995 Reenactment)).
15. Id.
16. See id. at 708.
17. See id. at 710.
2000]
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the town's
charter provision authorizing the town council to control land de-
velopment and subdivision projects was superseded by the Devel-
opment Review Act.' 8  The court also stated that "the
comprehensive land development and zoning statutes adopted by
the General Assembly require uniform mechanisms and functions
for their enforcement," and that as "essential elements in the uni-
form enforcement of statutes of statewide concern" the statutes do
not affect municipal government structures. 19 Therefore, the court
affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the town
council, acting as the platting board, violated the Development Re-
view Act.20
CONCLUSION
In Munroe v. Town of East Greenwich, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the Development and Subdivision Re-
view Act supersedes inconsistent ordinances adopted pursuant to a
town's charter provisions. The legislature clearly intended to es-
tablish uniform procedures for land development throughout the
state and in explicit terms superseded local regulations.
Russell P. Marsella
18. See id. at 709.
19. Id.
20. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
Municipal Law. Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740
A.2d 1255 (R.I. 1999). The Coastal Resources Management Coun-
cil (CRMC) has exclusive regulatory control over all construction of
residential, noncommercial wharves on tidal lands. Local munici-
palities do not share concurrent control with the CRMC over such
construction.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In January 1995, Kirk Dexter (Dexter) filed an application
with the CRMC to build a boating dock adjacent to his property in
Warren, Rhode Island.' The Kickemuit River, on which he
planned to construct his dock, was classified as such that certain
conditions were required in order to get approval. 2 The dock he
planned to build extended twelve feet beyond what was allowed
under the CRMC regulations and a variance was required.3
Between June of 1995 and February of 1996, members of the
CRMC met to discuss the application.4 The CRMC reviewed the
application, received staff reports and heard testimony of inter-
ested members of the community. 5 The agency found no engineer-
ing or biological objection to the proposed project from its own
staff.6 However, the Kickemuit River Council objected on the basis
that the dock would limit public access for swimming, small boat-
ing and shellfishing and would cause congestion. 7 Furthermore,
the Warren Harbor Management Committee objected on similar
grounds, in addition to concerns for water quality preservation of
the river.8 The Warren Conservation Commission echoed the con-
cerns of both the Kickemuit River Council and the Warren Harbor
Management Committee.9
The Town of Warren (Warren) also objected. 10 The basis of the
objection was that Dexter's property was located in a residential
1. See Town of Warren v. Thorton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1257 (R.I.
1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
20001 785
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zoning district in which a special-use permit was required in order
to build a residential boat dock." Dexter had neither applied for
nor received that permit. 12 Warren's solicitor informed Dexter
that it would issue a stop-work order on any construction if com-
menced. 13 Furthermore, the town informed the CRMC that the
agency could not approve Dexter's application if he was not in com-
pliance with local zoning requirements.14 The CRMC nonetheless
approved Dexter's application. In April 1996, the CRMC issued a
statement that "local approval is not required for the construction
and maintenance of dock facilities located within the State of
Rhode Island's tidal waters."' 5
In May of 1996, Warren filed a complaint seeking judicial re-
view and reversal of CRMC's decision,' 6 pursuant to the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, 17 and a declaratory judgment preventing
the CRMC from issuing a permit to an applicant who had not met
local zoning regulations.' 8 The judgment was entered in December
of 1997. The court remanded on the issue of CRMC's decision due
to a lack of substantial evidence, but determined that the CRMC
"possesses 'exclusive jurisdiction over recreational boating facili-
ties.'"'19 Warren filed a timely appeal, and requested review and
reversal by the supreme court. 20 A number of amicus briefs were
then filed in support of the Town of Warren and the CRMC. 21
Warren's argument on appeal was that the legislature in-
tended to give municipal governments authority to regulate the
construction of residential docks in tidal waters under the Rhode
Island Zoning Enabling Act of 199122 and the Comprehensive
Planning and Land Use Act.23 Therefore, the CRMC could not
grant approval unless the applicant received approval under the
11. See id.
12. See id. at 1257.
13. See id. at 1258.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15 (1956) (1993 Reenactment).
18. See Town of Warren, 740 A.2d at 1258.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 45-24-27 through 45-24-72 (1956) (1999
Reenactment).
23. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-22.2 (1956) (1999 Reenactment).
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local zoning regulations.24 The CRMC argued on appeal that the
CRMC enabling act 25 granted exclusive jurisdiction to the agency
over residential boating facilities.26 They further argued that the
legislature intended a "uniform" approach to regulation of coastal
resources at the state level rather than a "fragmented" approach at
the local level.27 The CRMC then cited Easton's Point Association,
Inc. v. Coastal Resources Management Council,28 where the court
held that the CRMC may waive local approval at its discretion. 29
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that the sole issue on
appeal was whether the legislature granted concurrent jurisdiction
over residential boating facilities to municipal governments and
the CRMC or whether the CRMC had exclusive jurisdiction. 30 As
the decision is a matter of statutory interpretation, the court re-
viewed de novo. 31 In making its determination, it addressed two
ancient doctrines of law essential to an understanding of regula-
tion of tidal lands in Rhode Island: the public-trust doctrine and
riparian rights.32
Public-Trust Doctrine
Pursuant to the public-trust doctrine, "'the state holds title to
all land below the high water mark in a proprietary capacity for
the benefit of the public.'" 33 In Greater Providence Chamber of
Commerce v. State,34 the court held that the state may grant tidal
land to another and that the state may also delegate land regula-
tion authority to another.3 5 The issue here is whether an express
intention to delegate this authority was made by the legislature.36
24. See Town of Warren, 740 A.2d at 1258.
25. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-23 (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
26. See Town of Warren, 740 A.2d at 1258-59.
27. See id.
28. 559 A.2d 633 (R.I. 1989).
29. See Town of Warren, 740 A.2d at 1259.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. (quoting Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d
1038, 1041 (R.I. 1995)).
34. 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995).
35. See Town of Warren, 740 A.2d at 1259-60.
36. See id. at 1260.
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The enabling act of the CRMC provides that the "CRMC is 'au-
thorized to approve, modify, set conditions for, or reject' any pro-
posed 'development or operation within, above, or beneath the tidal
water below the mean high water mark,' within certain limits set
forth in the statute."37 Therefore, there is an express intention of
the legislature that the agency regulate state lands held under the
public-trust doctrine. 38 The Zoning Enabling Act and Comprehen-
sive Planning and Land Use Act, however, do not reveal an express
intent of the legislature to grant authority to municipal govern-
ments with respect to regulation of state held tidal waters. 39 Un-
like the CRMC, Warren has not received an express statement of
legislative intent to be granted authority over state held tidal
waters. 40
Riparian Rights
Under the riparian rights doctrine, a riparian land owner has
a right to construct a dock to gain access to navigable waters, as
long as that dock does not obstruct the rights of other riparian land
owners. 41 Over time, that doctrine has been limited by legislative
enactments, including the requirement that the CRMC approve
construction of any dock in tidal waters.42 It is the opinion of the
court that absent an explicit statement that it intends to limit this
traditional right, the legislature cannot have intended additional
limits. 43 Therefore, since the legislature has not expressly granted
municipalities jurisdiction over tidal lands and the construction of
docks and wharves, the CRMC must have exclusive jurisdiction
over docks in tidal waters beginning at the mean high-water
mark.44
The court's holding limits the CRMC's exclusive jurisdiction
over tidal waters. 45 Municipalities still have zoning power and
share jurisdiction with the CRMC over projects that extend above
37. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-23-6(2) (1956) (1996 Reenactment)).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. (citing Nugent v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802, 805 (R.I. 1960)).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
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the mean high-water mark.46 Local municipalities have zoning au-
thority over the land appurtenant to the dock and towns are still
able to limit the way in which the land is used through zoning
regulations.47
In this case, the parties framed the issue as involving state
preemption of local municipality control.48 There are two ways in
which a local regulation may be preempted by state law.49 One
situation is when a municipal ordinance is in conflict with a state
ordinance focusing on the same issue, and the other is when the
legislature intended that a particular subject be entirely covered
by the statute.50 Here, Warren would not have authority to regu-
late tidal lands even if the CRMC did not exist.51 Therefore, the
court found that the case was not one of preemption. 52 Nonethe-
less, it found that arguments usually relied upon in cases of pre-
emption applied in this case.53 Specifically, the court addressed
policy considerations regarding the importance of protecting and
preserving Rhode Island's coastal resources.54 The supreme court
stated that if it allowed local municipalities to create their own
standards regarding wharves, the legislative intent to protect and
preserve coastal resources would be undermined. 55
CONCLUSION
In Town of Warren v. Thorton-Whitehouse, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the CRMC has "exclusive jurisdiction
over residential, noncommercial boat wharves that are constructed
on tidal land."56 With respect to areas above the mean high-water
mark, there is some overlap in jurisdiction between local munici-
palities and the CRMC. However, with respect to tidal areas, be-
ginning at the mean high-water mark, the CRMC has exclusive
jurisdiction. The legislature could have granted the regulation of
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1260.
48. See id. at 1261.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1261-62.
55. See id. at 1262.
56. Id.
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tidal lands to local municipalities, but because it did not expressly
do so, municipalities are without authority to regulate these areas.
Ann B. Sheppard
